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We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tari®s have to be
de¯ned by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tari® arcs. Costs of all
other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers,
and after the tari®s have been determined, the clients route their demands independent
of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to ¯nd tari®s that
maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication
networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client
utilizes at most one of the operator's tari® arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing
bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX-
hard. Moreover, we analyze the e®ect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an
m{approximation, and a (1 + lnD){approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the
total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional
restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this
problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance
guarantee, unless P=NP, and we prove the existence of an n{approximation algorithm.
c ° (Year) John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Keywords: telecommunication networks; pricing; Stackelberg game; complexity; approximation
1. INTRODUCTION
The pricing problem that we study is a Stackelberg game that involves two non-
cooperative groups, an operator that sets tari®s, the leader of the Stackelberg game,
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and clients that have to pay these tari®s, the followers of the Stackelberg game. More
precisely, we assume that a network is given, and a subset of the arcs, the tari® arcs,
are owned by an operator. The operator can determine tari®s on these tari® arcs, while
the costs for utilizing all other arcs are assumed to be given. Each client wishes to route
a certain demand on a path connecting two vertices. We assume that after the tari®s
have been announced, each client sel¯shly selects a path with minimum total cost to
route her demand. Thus, before the clients select their paths, the operator has to set
the tari®s, which she does in order to maximize her total revenue. In order to avoid
non-boundedness, we assume that clients always have the alternative of routing on a
path without using any of the operators arcs.
Notice that this problem is di®erent in two aspects from the network congestion prob-
lems studied recently, e.g., by Roughgarden and Tardos [12], and Cole et al. [4, 5]. First,
we assume that there is no congestion, hence the clients do not in°uence each other.
They choose minimum cost paths to route their demands, independent of each other. A
game theoretic setting is only present due to the fact that there exists an operator trying
to maximize the total revenue, and the clients e®ectively minimize the total revenue by
choosing minimum cost paths. Second, due to the fact that the pricing takes place before
the clients choose their paths, we are faced with a Stackelberg game. Notice that the
second phase of this Stackelberg game is indeed trivial, since the clients are independent
of each other.
1.1 Model
In order to clarify the relation to previous work, we ¯rst formulate the general network
pricing problem, and then discuss the restricted version considered in this paper.
An instance of the general network pricing problem is a directed graph G = (N;A),
where the arc set A is partitioned into a set of m tari® arcs T µ A and a set of ¯xed cost
arcs F = A n T. There are n clients (or commodities) k 2 f1;:::;ng, and each client k
has a demand dk that has to be routed from source node sk to target node tk
1. Without
loss of generality, we assume that all demand values dk are scaled to be integral. The
tari® for the utilization of any tari® arc a 2 T must be determined by the operator; it
is denoted by ¿a. The tari® for the utilization of any ¯xed cost arc is assumed to be
given for all ¯xed cost arcs. The clients route their demands from source to destination
through a path with minimal total cost, where the total per unit cost of a path is de¯ned
as the sum of the tari®s and ¯xed costs on the arcs of the path. Whenever the client
has a choice among multiple paths with the same total cost but with di®erent revenues
for the operator, we assume that the client takes the path that is most pro¯table to the
operator. (This can always be achieved with arbitrary precision by reducing tari®s by
some small value ".) We assume that an (sk;tk)-path exists consisting only of ¯xed cost
arcs for every client k 2 f1;:::;ng, since the problem is otherwise unbounded. Without
going into further details, we mention that this problem is a classical Stackelberg game
that can be modelled as a bilinear bilevel program [10].
1Notice that we abuse standard notation from Graph Theory, since m denotes the number of
tari® arcs, and n denotes the number of clients in the given digraph G = (N;A). This because
the actual number of nodes and arcs of G are of minor interest for the present paper.
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Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 3
We next describe a simple transformation of the given graph G that allows one to
restrict to very speci¯c graphs (although probably losing certain graph properties, such
as planarity). When we replace all shortest paths that only consist of ¯xed cost arcs
by direct arcs, and possibly introduce additional dummy arcs with zero or in¯nite cost,
respectively, we obtain a shortest path graph model as described by Bouhtou et al. [3].
After this transformation, we can assume that all tari® arcs are pairwise disjoint, and
there exists a direct arc from the source node sk to the tail node of any tari® arc a, and
a direct arc from the head node of any tari® arc a to any target node tk. Moreover,
there exists a ¯xed cost arc (sk;tk) for all clients k = 1;:::;n, and the ¯xed cost for
that arc, which we denote by uk, represents the cheapest possible (sk;tk)-path (in the
original graph) without using any of the tari® arcs. In other words, uk represents the
highest acceptable total per unit price for client k.
The additional assumption in the problem considered in this paper, to which we refer
as the river tari® pricing problem (RTP), is the following: Independent of the tari®s, we
assume that any client routes her demand on a path that includes at most one tari® arc.
In Section 1.2, we discuss practical applications for this model, motivated by problems
in telecommunication networks. In the shortest path graph model, this restriction is
equivalent to the deletion of any backward-arc that might exist between head nodes of
tari® arcs and tail nodes of other tari® arcs. Figure 1 illustrates the shortest path graph
model of an instance of the river tari® pricing problem with three tari® arcs and two












Figure 1. River tari® pricing problem (RTP) with n = 2 clients and m = 3 tari® arcs.
also assume without loss of generality that all ¯xed cost arcs incident with the target
nodes tk have zero cost, because otherwise we can just add their costs to the ¯xed cost
arcs incident with source nodes sk. Therefore, let us denote by cka the cost of the arc
that connects customer k to tari® arc a. The value uk ¡ cka then represents client k's
highest acceptable tari® for utilizing tari® arc a. It can as well be interpreted as client k's
valuation for tari® arc a. Notice that the only di®erence to the general network pricing
problem described previously is the non-existence of backward arcs in the shortest path
graph model.
To summarize, the parameters that de¯ne an instance of a river tari® pricing problem
are the number of tari® arcs m, the number of clients n, their demand values dk, k 2
f1;:::;ng, and the costs for ¯xed cost arcs. We have cka as the cost of the ¯xed cost arcs
that connect customers k to tari® arcs a, and uk as the cost of arc (sk;tk), the highest
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acceptable cost for client k. Due to the fact that any path taken by a client involves
exactly one ¯xed cost arc with non-zero cost, we may assume without loss of generality
that the costs cka of these ¯xed cost arcs are integral. Moreover, due to the integrality of
the costs of the ¯xed cost arcs, it follows that any solution utilizing non-integral tari®s
can be straightforwardly improved. Notice that this might not be true for the general
network pricing problem, where a path chosen by a client can consist of more than one
tari® arc.
1.2 Applications
The present study of the river tari® pricing problem as described above is motivated
by practical interest from the telecommunications industry; it was carried out within a
joint research project initiated by France T¶ el¶ ecom and Maastricht University.
An instance of the problem arises, for example, when considering the international
interconnections market, where several operators o®er telecom connections to a particu-
lar country. Focussing on the market for entering a particular country { France in our
example { France T¶ el¶ ecom asks what tari®s it should use for its proprietary connections
into the country such as to maximize revenue. There are several other operators com-
peting with France T¶ el¶ ecom by o®ering similar services. For a schematic illustration see
Figure 2. Here, the dashed lines depict the connections o®ered by the operator (tari®
Figure 2. International interconnections market.
arcs) and the solid lines depict the connections o®ered by the competitors (¯xed cost
arcs). It is a common practice that once the data of a client enters the local network of
the destination country this data will be transmitted to the destination point without
leaving and reentering the local network. So, given the set of clients willing to transmit
their data to France and the prices of the competitors, the operator would like to deter-
mine prices for the tari® arcs such as to maximize her total revenue, therefore facing an
instance of the river tari® pricing problem.
Another telecom application for the problem at hand is point-to-point markets, where
an operator is o®ering bandwidth capacity between two points A and B. Other operators
Page 4 of 16






























































Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 5
are active in this market as well. Their prices for bandwidth capacity are known. Clients
can choose between di®erent levels of Quality of Service (QoS) from each operator, and
clients have a preference for the QoS-levels. We can model this problem as an instance of
the river tari® pricing problem, too. Figure 3 shows a small example with two customers,

















Figure 3. Point-to-point markets.
represented by the subnetwork between the nodes qis and qit, where i 2 f1;2;3g. In
this example, customer (s1;t1) is interested in two QoS levels, namely QoS1 and QoS2,
whereas customer (s2;t2) is interested in QoS2 and QoS3. The preference of each cus-
tomer k with regard to each QoS level is determined by the cost of the edge from the
source sk to the node qis, i 2 f1;2;3g, smaller cost indicating a higher preference for the
QoS level. The prices of other operators for the same QoS level is given by the cost on
the (¯xed cost) arcs (qis;qit), i 2 f1;2;3g. The revenue for the operator for each QoS
level i, i 2 f1;2;3g is then determined by setting appropriate tari®s on the tari® arcs
(dashed arcs).
1.3 Related work
A formulation of the general network pricing problem is the bilinear bilevel program
described by Labb¶ e et al. [10]. They show, among other things, that already the problem
with a single client is strongly NP-hard, given that also non-negative tari®s are allowed.
Roch et al. [11] prove NP-hardness for the same problem with non-negative tari®s, and
propose a polynomial time (1+1=2 lnm){approximation algorithm for the problem with a
single client, where m is the number of tari® arcs. This result implies also a O(nlogm){
approximation for the case of multiple clients. In the present paper, we consider the
problem restricted to the case where each client utilizes at most one tari® arc, and we
consider the case of multiple clients.
In fact, the problem at hand can equivalently be interpreted as a pricing problem
for multiple products, where the tari® arcs a 2 T correspond to di®erent products,
and each client k is interested in buying dk units of one product. Since we consider
uncapacitated networks, products are available in unlimited amount (e.g., bulk or digital
goods). Whenever there is an arc between a client k and a tari® arc a in the river tari®
pricing problem, the interpretation is that client k is interested in buying product a. If
she decides to buy product a, she incurs a per unit shipment cost of cka, in addition to
the per unit cost of ¿a for product a. The ¯xed cost uk of the ¯xed cost arc (sk;tk) is
simply interpreted as the maximum total (per unit) price a client k is willing to pay to
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6 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. (Volume Number) ((Year))
purchase any of the products. In other words, uk ¡cka represents client k's valuation for
product a.
After this discussion, we can exhibit a close relation of the river tari® pricing problem
considered in this paper to other papers that address multi-product pricing problems.
Recently, two groups of researchers, independently of each other, reported several results
for such problems. Aggarwal et al. [1], among other things, consider a multi-product
pricing problem where any client k has di®erent budgets bka for di®erent products a,
which are available in unlimited amount. The operator has to determine prices for the
products in order to maximize the total revenue, under the assumption that a client
buys (one unit of) the cheapest product among the products she can a®ord. Aggarwal
et al. [1] prove APX-hardness of this problem, together with a (1 + lnn)-approximation
algorithm. Notice that, despite of the obvious similarities, the multi-product pricing
problem is conceptually di®erent from the river tari® pricing problem considered in this
paper. In the river tari® pricing problem problem, clients choose the product with
minimum total per unit cost, also taking into account the shipment costs cka, rather
than the cheapest product among all a®ordable products.
Guruswami et al. [8] consider a pro¯t-maximizing envy-free pricing problem. Clients
have di®erent valuations for di®erent products, and each product is available in limited
amount. The operator has to determine prices for the products, and allocate the products
to clients such that, again, total revenue is maximized, and given the pricing, no client
would prefer to be assigned a di®erent product. Here, the clients measure their prefer-
ences in terms of the di®erence between their valuation and the purchase price. If the
price is higher than the clients' valuation, then the client does not purchase the product.
In fact, the pro¯t-maximizing envy-free pricing problem with unlimited supply of prod-
ucts is equivalent to the river tari® pricing problem considered here. Guruswami et al. [8]
independently prove APX-hardness of the problem, and derive a (2lnn)-approximation
algorithm for the case of unit demand of clients, and with limited supply of products.
1.4 Our results
In this paper, we derive several results concerning complexity and approximability of
the river tari® pricing problem. In Section 2.1, by a reduction from the Max-2-Sat-3
problem, we show that the river tari® pricing problem is APX-hard, even if each client
is connected to at most two tari® arcs. Hence, the problem does not admit a polynomial
time approximation scheme, unless P=NP. This result coincides with the APX-hardness
result of Guruswami et al. [8]; obtained independently. The quality of uniform tari®
pricing policies, where all arcs are priced with the same tari®, is analyzed in Section 2.2
The problem to ¯nd an optimal uniform tari® is solvable in polynomial time by simple
enumeration. We show that uniform tari® pricing is an m{approximation, and this is
tight. Using a simple geometric argument, we also show that uniform tari® pricing is a
(1 + lnD){approximation, which is tight up to a constant factor. Here, D is the total
demand that is served by the operator in an optimal solution, which is clearly upper
bounded by the total demand. Hence, whenever the clients have unit demand, our result
yields a (1+lnn){approximation. In Section 2.3, we empirically analyze and discuss the
quality of uniform tari® pricing policies using instances of international interconnection
markets provided by France T¶ el¶ ecom.
In Section 3., we consider another variant of the problem, namely where the operator
is not allowed to reject any client. We refer to that variant as all-service river tari®
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Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 7
pricing problem, or all-service RTP. Notice that rejecting clients might increase the total
revenue, since some clients might exist that can only be served at a low price, while others
would be willing to pay much more. We show, by a reduction from the Independent
Set problem, that the all-service RTP problem does not allow approximation to within
a factor O(m1 - ") or O(n1/2 - "), unless P=NP. (Recall that m is the number of tari®
arcs and n is the number of clients.) On the positive side, we can show that the problem
admits an n-approximation.
2. RIVER TARIFF PRICING: COMPLEXITY AND APPROXIMATION
We ¯rst discuss the computational complexity of the river tari® pricing problem.
Subsequently, we derive bounds on the quality of uniform tari® pricing policies, where
all tari®s are required to be identical, and ¯nally, we brie°y discuss these result on the
basis of problem instances from France T¶ el¶ ecom.
2.1 Complexity
In a conference version of this paper [7], we proved that the river tari® pricing prob-
lem is (strongly) NP-hard by a reduction from 3-Satisfiability. Here we present a
modi¯cation of that reduction that yields a stronger result, namely APX-hardness of the
river tari® pricing problem. Thereby we can exclude the existence of a polynomial time
approximation scheme, unless P=NP. Notice that this result coincides with the APX-
hardness of the pro¯t maximization problem considered by Guruswami et al. [8]. Also
notice that Roch et al. [11] show that the general network pricing problem is strongly
NP-hard, even when restricted to a single client. Their reduction works for tari® pricing
problems where paths are allowed to use (and indeed, must use) several tari® arcs. In
a certain sense, the problem that we consider here is `dual' to theirs, as we restrict to a
single tari® arc, but allow for more than one client.
THEOREM 1: (See also Guruswami et al [8].) The river tari® pricing problem is
APX-hard, even when each client is connected to at most two tari® arcs, and if the costs
of the ¯xed cost arcs are restricted to be 0, 1 or 2.
PROOF: We use an approximation preserving reduction from Max-2-Sat-3: Given
a set of boolean variables X = fx1;:::;xng and a collection C of clauses over X such
that each clause consists of at most two variables and each variable occurs in at most 3
clauses, the question is to ¯nd a truth assignment that satis¯es the maximum number of
clauses. This problem is known to be APX-hard, see e.g. [2].
For each variable xi, i 2 f1;:::;ng of the Max-2-Sat-3 instance, we construct a
constant-size subnetwork as shown in Figure 4. Each of these subnetworks has three
clients with unit demand. For each variable xi, let the origin-destination pairs of these
clients be denoted by fsij;tijg, j 2 f1;2;3g. Moreover, each subnetwork has two tari®
arcs, one denoted by ai representing the truth assignment xi = 1, and one denoted by ¹ ai
representing xi = 0.
An upper bound on the cost of routing commodities 1 and 3 is given by ¯xed cost arcs
(si1;ti1) and (si3;ti3), each with cost 2. For commodity 2, the upper bound on the cost
is given by a ¯xed cost arc (si2;ti2), with cost 1.
Next, for each clause Ck, k 2 f1;:::;mg, we create a clause-commodity k with origin
destination pairs fsk;tkg, with unit demand. Whenever a variable xi (¹ xi, respectively)
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Figure 4. Subnetwork for variable xi, i 2 f1;:::;ng.
appears in clause Ck, we connect sk to si1 (si3, respectively), and ti1 (ti3, respectively)
to tk, using arcs of zero cost. In addition, we introduce a ¯xed cost arc (sk;tk) with
cost 1, de¯ning an upper bound of 1 for the cost of routing clause-commodity k. The so-
de¯ned instance of the river tari® pricing problem has 2n tari® arcs, 3n+m commodities
(or clients), and at most 7m + 11n ¯xed cost arcs, hence the transformation is indeed
polynomial.
We claim that an optimal solution of this instance of the river tari® pricing problem
yields a revenue of 4n + r, where r denotes the maximum number of satis¯ed clauses in
the Max-2-Sat-3 instance. Indeed, when given a truth assignment specifying xi, we set
the tari® of arc ai (¹ ai) to 1, and the tari® of arc ¹ ai (ai) to 2 if xi is true (if xi is false). By
observing that the maximal revenue for each subnetwork equals 4, and that we obtain
1 for each clause-commodity corresponding to a satis¯ed clause (by routing its demand
via the tari® arc with a tari® of 1), we ¯nd a solution with value 4n + r.
Conversely, we now argue that in an optimal solution each subnetwork contains one
tari® arc with tari® 1, and the other tari® arc with tari® 2. Indeed, notice that it does not
make sense to use any other values for the tari®s. Further, if both tari®s equal 2, we can
decrease one tari® to 1 without lowering the revenue. Moreover, if in some subnetwork
both tari®s equal 1, there is one tari® arc through which at most one clause commodity
is routed (this follows from the fact that each variable occurs at most three times in all
clauses). When raising this tari® from 1 to 2, we are compensated for this loss of at
most 1 by the corresponding commodity in the subnetwork which brings an additional
revenue of 1.
Thus, we conclude that the tari® arcs with value 1 de¯ne a valid truth assignment, and
the corresponding revenue is at most 4n + r. Hence an inapproximability gap for Max-
2-Sat-3 translates to an inapproximability gap for the river tari® pricing problem.
Observe that we have delineated a borderline between easy and hard instances of
the river tari® pricing problem, since if each client is connected to at most one arc the
problem is trivial, while in the described reduction each client is connected to at most
two tari® arcs. Guruswami et al [8] independently presented another reduction from a
restricted version of the vertex cover problem, yielding exactly the same conclusions.
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Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 9
2.2 The quality of uniform tari® pricing
The uniform tari® pricing problem (UTP) is the same as the general tari® pricing
problem, with the additional restriction that all tari®s are required to be identical. An
optimal uniform tari® can be found in time O(nm) by just enumerating all tari®s of the
form uk ¡ cka, k = 1;:::;n, a = 1;:::;m. Clearly, any uniform price other than that
cannot be optimal, since the tari®s could be increased by some positive amount without
losing any client.
We next analyze the loss that can be experienced by adopting such a uniform tari®
pricing policy for the river tari® pricing problem. Therefore, denote by ¦UTP the revenue
for an optimal uniform tari® pricing, and by ¦RTP the revenue for an optimal non-uniform
tari® pricing. By de¯nition, ¦UTP · ¦RTP.
LEMMA 2: If an optimal solution to the river tari® pricing problem with revenue
¦RTP utilizes at most r di®erent tari®s, then ¦UTP ¸ ¦RTP=r, where ¦UTP is the optimal
revenue for the case with the uniform tari® restriction.
PROOF: Consider an optimal solution to the river tari® pricing problem with non-
uniform tari®s ¿1 · ¢¢¢ · ¿m, and let Di be the total demand on an arc ai with tari® ¿i,
i 2 f1;:::;mg. By D =
Pn
k=1 Dk we denote the total demand served by the operator.
Then the revenue created by this solution is the area under the following `staircase'
function f : [0;D] ! [0;1[, depicted in Figure 5.
f(x) = ¿i for all x with
X
j<i
Dj · x <
X
j·i














































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Staircase function f(x) with inscribed maximal rectangle.
Consider any of the rectangles inscribed under the graph of function f(x), with area
Ti := ¿i¢
P
j¸i Dj. Then it holds that ¦UTP ¸ Ti for all i 2 f1;:::;mg, since the area of
any such rectangle is a lower bound for the revenue yielded by the optimal uniform tari®
¦UTP. (Notice that this does not hold for the general network pricing problem.) Hence,
if only r di®erent tari®s are utilized, we consider the r (inclusion-)maximal rectangles
under function f, say Ti1;:::;Tir, and get r ¢ ¦UTP ¸
Pr
j=1 Tij ¸ ¦RTP.
Since r · m, Lemma 2 yields the following theorem. Tightness of the result will be
shown below, using Example 1.
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10 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. (Volume Number) ((Year))
THEOREM 3: Uniform tari® pricing is an m{approximation for the river tari®
pricing problem.
We next derive an another bound on the quality of uniform tari® pricing policies,
developing further the same geometric argument.
THEOREM 4: Uniform tari® pricing is a (1 + lnD){approximation for the river
tari® pricing problem, where D ·
Pn
k=1 dk is the total demand that is served by the
operator in an optimal solution.
PROOF: Consider an optimal non-uniform tari® pricing, and recall the de¯nition
of the corresponding staircase function f in (1), as well as the inscribed rectangles, with
areas Ti = ¿i ¢
P
j¸i Dj. Let ` be the index of the maximal area rectangle among all Ti,
with area T`. Let x` :=
P
j¸` Dj = T`=¿`. Moreover, denote by ¿max the maximal tari®









for x 2 [0;D): (3)
We claim that g(x) ¸ f(x) for x 2 [0;D). To see this, take any x with
P
j<i Dj · x < P















¸ ¿i = f(x);
where the ¯rst inequality follows by choice of x, and the last follows because ` is the

















































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Illustration for the proof of Theorem 4.
Hence, the area under the function g(x);0 · x · D, is a valid upper bound for the
area under the staircase function, which equals ¦RTP, see Figure 6. To compute the
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Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 11
area under the function g(x);0 · x · D, we partition it into three parts, namely the
rectangle T` itself, the area under g(x) on the domain x 2 [0;D ¡ x`], as well as the
area to the right of g(x) for g(x) 2 [¿`;¿max]. The latter is the integral of the function
D ¡ g¡1(¿) = T`=¿ on the domain [¿`;¿max]. We thus obtain the following.











= T`[1 + lnD + ln¿max ¡ ln¿` ¡ lnx`]
= T` [1 + ln(D¿max=T`)] :
Then, (2) follows from the above because T` · ¦UTP.
In the case of unit demands of the clients, that is, if dk = 1 for all clients k = 1;:::;n,
we obtain the following.
COROLLARY: Whenever clients have unit demands, uniform tari® pricing is a
(1 + lnn){approximation for the river tari® pricing problem.
Finally, let us show tightness of the bounds in Theorems 3 and 4.
EXAMPLE 1: Given n=m clients and m tari® arcs. Every client is operating her
own subnetwork with one tari® arc, thus the entire network consists of m disjoint sub-
networks and each of them contains one client and one tari® arc. Fix b > 1 and let the
demand of client k in subnetwork k be given by dk = b
k ¡ b
k¡1, k 2 f1;:::;mg. This
way, the total demand equals b
m ¡ 1. Moreover, the maximal revenue for subnetwork k
is limited by a ¯xed cost arc (sk;tk), with cost uk = b
2m¡k. Hence, the maximal tari®
¿max equals b
2m¡1. See Figure 7 for an example with n = m = 4.
0 0
2 2 t s
0 0
3 3 t s
0 0
4 4 t s
0 0












Figure 7. The analysis of uniform pricing is tight.
In the optimal solution, the tari® for each subnetwork k is set to its maximal value,
b
2m¡k. Each subnetwork therefore contributes a revenue of b
2m ¡ b
2m¡1, and ¦RTP =
m(b
2m ¡ b
2m¡1). The optimal uniform pricing consists in setting the tari® on all tari®
arcs to b
m. This way, every unit of demand creates a pro¯t of b
m, yielding a total revenue
of b
2m¡b
m. Other uniform tari®s would be values b
2m¡k, k 2 f1;:::;m¡1g. This yields
a total revenue of b
2m ¡ b
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Now, observe that in the optimal solution m di®erent tari®s are utilized. Lemma 2
(Theorem 3, respectively) suggests that uniform pricing provides an m{approximation.
Example 1 proves that this is best possible, since b can be chosen arbitrarily large.
Moreover, Theorem 4 suggests that uniform pricing is a (1+lnD){approximation. In
Example 1, we have D = (b
m ¡ 1) and thus (1 + lnD) = 1 + ln(b
m ¡ 1) · 1 + mlnb.
Hence, Theorem 4 yields that uniform pricing is a O(m){approximation on this example.
The same Example 1 shows that O(m) is indeed best possible. The above discussion
leads to the following result:
THEOREM 5: For uniform tari® pricing, the performance bound of Theorem 3 is
best possible, and the performance bound of Theorem 4 is best possible up to a constant
factor.
2.3 Discussion
Notice that claim (2) in the proof of Theorem 4 con¯rms the following intuition: If
the staircase function f(x) approximates the straight line x 7! (¿max=D) ¢ x, geometric
intuition suggests that uniform tari® pricing yields a 2-approximation, since the size of
the largest rectangle inscribed under f(x) would be of exactly half of the area under
f(x). In that case, T` approximately equals D¿max=4, and our analysis indeed yields an
approximation ratio of (1+ln4) ¼ 2:4 for uniform tari® pricing, the additional 0:4 being
caused by the di®erence between the functions g(x) and f(x).
Notice also that the worst case example, Example 1, crucially hinges on a staircase
function f(x) that approximates a hyperbola; in particular it requires exponential prices.
Thus, it can be conjectured that the empirical performance of uniform tari® pricing
policies on practical instances, where the price range is subexponential, outperforms
the theoretical bounds we have found. Our experiments, using data from the France
T¶ el¶ ecom interconnections market, are summarized in Figure 2.3 and they corroborate
this conjecture.
Instance jNj jAj m n ¦
RTP ¦
UTP %
RTN1 29 94 7 15 841 624 74%
RTN2 29 98 6 21 4099 3496 85%
RTN3 59 206 10 13 1118 880 79%
RTN4 59 204 10 20 2217 1512 68%
RTN5 49 120 9 21 74948 55968 74%
RTN6 33 116 15 12 28166 20328 72%
RTN4
Figure 2.3: Uniform pricing on France T¶ el¶ ecom instances.
The table on the left of Figure 2.3 shows data for 6 instances that represent telecom-
munication networks for the international interconnections market, as described in Sec-
tion 1.2 We compare the optimal solution values for uniform tari®s ¦UTP and non-uniform
tari®s ¦RTP. The optimal non-uniform solution is calculated using the model and mixed
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Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 13
integer programming formulation described by Bouhtou et al. [3]. The value of ¦UTP
is calculated using the same formulation, requiring that all tari®s be equal. We do not
compare the actual computation times here, but are only interested in e®ectiveness of the
optimal uniform pricing. The table gives a brief description of each network, stating the
number of nodes jNj, arcs jAj, tari® arcs m, and clients n. The optimal non-uniform and
uniform solution values are displayed in the columns ¦RTP and ¦UTP. The ¯nal column
is the approximation ratio. The graphs on the right of Figure 2.3 show the staircase
function f(x) for the optimal non-uniform solution, as well as the best uniform solution,
for instance RTN4.
3. ALL-SERVICE RIVER TARIFF PRICING
In this section, we consider the following variation of the river tari® pricing problem.
The operator must set tari®s in order to capture the demand of all clients, that is, tari®s
must be such that no client k is forced to use the arc (sk;tk). We refer to this problem
as the all-service river tari® pricing problem.
It follows from trivial examples that the maximal revenue for the all-service problem
can be an arbitrary factor away from the maximal revenue without the all-service con-
straint. Hence, we have an arbitrarily high `cost of regulation', where the regulation
consists of the fact that we force the operator to serve all clients. Notice that in case
uk < cka for some clients k and tari® arcs a, the operator might even be forced to use
negative tari®s, up to the extreme case where the optimal revenue becomes negative. In
such a situation, the notion of approximation algorithms is senseless. Hence, with respect
to approximability, we consider the special case where uk ¸ cka for all clients k and tari®
arcs a. We show that even for this restriction, the maximal revenue for the all-service
river tari® pricing problem cannot be approximated within any reasonable bound.
THEOREM 6: For any " > 0, the existence of a polynomial time approximation
algorithm for the all-service river tari® pricing problem with n clients and m tari® arcs
with worst case ratio O(m1-") or O(n1/2-") implies P=NP.
PROOF: We use an approximation preserving reduction from Independent Set
[6] to the all-service problem. The Independent Set problem asks for ¯nding in a
graph G = (V;E) a maximum cardinality subset V 0 µ V such that no two vertices in V 0
are connected by an edge. The transformation works as follows. For every vertex v 2 V
we introduce a client with origin-destination pair fsv;tvg and demand dv = jEj, and a
corresponding tari® arc av. We connect the source sv to the tail of the tari® arc av, and
the head of av to the destination tv, using zero cost ¯xed cost arcs. Moreover, there is
a ¯xed cost arc (sv;tv) with cost (jV j + 1) for all vertices v 2 V . For every edge e 2 E
we introduce a client with origin-destination pair fse;teg and unit demand. The upper
bound on the cost of routing this demand is given by the ¯xed cost arc (se;te) with cost
1. For all edges e 2 E and all vertices v 2 V with v 2 e, we furthermore introduce ¯xed
cost arcs (se;tail(av)) and (head(av);te), with zero cost. This transformation results in
an instance of the all-service problem with jV j tari® arcs, and jV j+jEj clients. Figure 8
gives an example of such a transformation for a graph G = (V;E) with 3 nodes and 2
edges.
We claim that G has an independent set of cardinality at least k if and only if there
exists a tari® policy for the all-service problem with a total revenue of jV jjEj(k+1)+jEj.
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14 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. (Volume Number) ((Year))
First, assume that G has an independent set V 0 of cardinality k. For all v 2 V 0, set
the tari® on the corresponding tari® arc av to jV j + 1, and all other tari®s to 1. By
the de¯nition of an independent set, for any edge e = (v;u) 2 E at least one of the
vertices, v or u, is not in V 0. Therefore, the tari® of at least one of the tari® arcs, av or
au is 1. All clients corresponding to an edge e can thus be served, using one of the tari®
arcs av or au. The clients (sv;tv) corresponding to the vertices v 2 V are also served,
since the upper bound of jV j + 1 is not exceeded with the so-de¯ned tari®s. Hence, all
demands are served. The revenue consists of jEj from all clients corresponding to the
edges E of G, jEj(jV j + 1)k from the clients corresponding to the independent set V 0,
and jEj(jV j¡k) from the clients corresponding to V nV 0. That yields a total revenue of





a2 a3 a1 |V|+1 |V|+1 |V|+1 1 1
t t t t t
sb s1
1 a 2 b 3
s2 sa s3
Figure 8. Reduction of Independent Set to all-service pricing problem.
Conversely, assume that there exists a set of tari®s that captures all demands, such
that the revenue is jEjjV j(k +1)+jEj. We will show that this implies that the graph G
has an independent set of cardinality at least k. Since all demands are captured at this
tari® pricing policy, for any edge e = (v;u) 2 E, the tari® on at least one of the arcs, av
or au, is 1. Consider the set of vertices V 0 := fv 2 V : tav > 1g. By de¯nition, no pair
of nodes v;u 2 V 0 is connected by an edge. Hence, V 0 is an independent set in G. Let
k0 := jV 0j. The revenue is equal to jEj+jEj(jV j¡k0)+jEj(jV j+1)k0 = jEjjV j(k0+1)+jEj,
which by assumption is at least as large as jEjjV j(k +1)+ jEj. This implies that k0 ¸ k
and thus that V 0 is an independent set in G of cardinality k0 ¸ k.
Now, let us assume that we have an ®-approximation algorithm A for the all-service
problem, with ® ¸ 1. Consider any instance G = (V;E) of Independent Set, and the
all-service problem resulting from the above reduction. We can assume that both the
optimal solution and the solution produced by A only utilize tari® values 1 or jV j + 1,
because any tari® greater than 1 and not equal to jV j+1 can be turned into jV j+1 with
a revenue gain. So ¦RTP = jEjjV j(k+1)+jEj for some k, and ¦A = jEjjV j(k0+1)+jEj
for some k0. The ¯rst part of the proof yields that the maximal independent set of G





jEjjV j(k0 + 1) + jEj
jEjjV j(k + 1) + jEj
=
1 + 1
jV j + k0
1 + 1





hence k0 ¸ (k+1)=®¡2. In other words, we have an O(®){approximation algorithm for
the Independent Set problem.
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Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 15
It follows from Zuckerman [13], who recently improved a previous result from Hº astad [9],
that the Independent Set problem cannot have a polynomial time approximation al-
gorithm with worst case guarantee jV j1¡" for any " > 0, unless P=NP. Since the number
of tari® arcs m in our transformation equals jV j, the ¯rst claim of the theorem follows.
Since the number of clients n in our transformation equals jV j+jEj 2 O(jV j2), the second
claim follows.
Notice that this inapproximability result shows that, for the all-service RTP, we cannot
even expect a performance guarantee logarithmic in the total demand D, like the one we
obtained before. On the positive side, however, we can show the following.
THEOREM 7: There exists an n-approximation algorithm for the all-service river
tari® pricing problem.
PROOF: In an optimal solution, at least one client contributes to the total revenue
at least ¦RTP=n, and this contribution is achieved by utilizing a speci¯c tari® arc at a
certain tari®. The proof now works by enumeration over all m¢n possibilities for a client
using a speci¯c arc. So assume that a tari® arc b and a client k are ¯xed. We claim that
we can compute the maximum tari® ¿b on arc b, together with tari®s on all the other
arcs, such that client k indeed utilizes arc b and all other clients are served. Taking the
maximum over all m¢n possibilities for a client using a speci¯c arc, the revenue of this
solution is obviously at least ¦RTP=n.
The computation of this maximum tari® ¿b on arc b, together with tari®s on all the
other arcs, such that client k indeed utilized arc b and all other clients are served, can
be achieved by binary search over the possible tari®s ¿ on arc b. Denote by cka the ¯xed
cost for client k when utilizing arc a, and recall that uk denotes the maximum total (per
unit) cost for client k. Given that client k utilizes arc b, the maximum tari® on arc b is
uk ¡ckb, which determines the interval for the binary search. Given some tari® ¿ on arc
b, in order to make sure that client k utilizes arc b, we just de¯ne the tari®s on all other
tari® arcs a as ¿a = ¿ + ckb ¡ cka. It is straightforward to verify if this yields a feasible
solution with all clients served or not.
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